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Privatization of marketing and the adoption of free-market
pricing  is easier  under  the caisse  system  than  under  the monopo-
listic marketing  board  system. A  progressive  export tax system,
based  on a market-determined  price,  can ease  the transition  from
a fixed  producer  pricing  system  to a free-market  pricing  system.
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Varangis, Akiyama, and  Thigpen document the  involves increasing competition in an existing
diffiwulties  various countries in Sub-Saharan  private sector (step A).
Africa have had with marketing  and pricing
systems,  and show how these  systems  have been  Under the monopolistic  marketing  bard
caused  or exacerbated  by government  controls.  system, countries  should identify activities  (such
They document the steps several countries have  as processing) that can be performed immedi-
taken toward-relaxing  those controls and allow-  ately by the private sector and take steps to
ing more participation  by private enterprise.  transfer  those steps to the private sector  (step B).
They draw some general conclusions about  In countries with a mwdeting board system
the kinds of changes  in parastatal  marketing  and a weak private  sector, export  and domestic
organizations  that most effectively  improve  their  marketing  can initially  be shared by the bc-nds
ability to market crops efficiently  and copc with  and the private sector,  with boards acting as
changes  in world prices:  "buyers  of last resort." Over time the boards
should  be treated  as just another  of the maket-
The path a country  should takc toward more  ing agencies  competing  with the private sector
privatc sector participation  depends heavily  on  (step C).
the forrn of marketing  and pricing  system that
exists and the time necded  to develop  needed  After taking steps B and C, markcting
skills in the private sector.  boards  will be like caisses  and in time can take
step A.
Complete  or increased  privatization  of
marketing  and adoption  of frec-market  pricing is  If an immcdiate  change from a fixed pro-
casicr under thc caisse system than the market-  ducer pricing  system to a free-market  pricing
ing board system. Under the caisse system,  the  system is not feasible  or is judged undesirable,  a
privatc sector alrcady handles  domestic  and  gradual  transition can be made by implementing
export marketing  - so the transition  essentially  a progressivc  export tax system that is more pro-
gressive in the initial stages.
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REFERENCES  ......  681.  With the recent sharp declines in world market price- for several
agricultural products, marketing and  pricing systems in many  Sub-Saharan
African  countries have  been  experiencing financial and  other  problems.
Because of the over-riding  importance  of priwiary  export  commodities  for many
Sub-Saharan  countries,  inadequate  performance  of marketing  and pricing  systems
can lead to large  losses  in the  welfare  of farmers,  in export  performance,  in
government  revenues  and in  economic  development.
2.  In light of the problems  experienced,  several  Sub-Saharan  countries
have recently  taken important  steps  toward  changing  their  commodity  marketing
and pricing systems,  often with adjustment  assistance  from the World Bank.
These steps range from complete  abolition of governmental  bodies and their
replacement with  private marketing and  pricing organizations to  sharply
cutting  staff  and  streamlining  operations  in  government-controlled
organizations.  This paper describes recent events and identifies  evolving
trends in the marketing and pricing systems for major agricultural  export
commodities in Sub-Saharan  Africa and  evaluates their effectiveness.  The
first section  classifies  the predominant  marketing  and pricing  structures  for
export coommodities  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  t  is followed  by a review  of the
problems these  systems have  faced  in recent years.  The  third  section
describes and analyzes recent developments in these systems.  Section IV
concludes.
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3.  Marketing  and pricing  systems  for  export  crops  are often  developed  in
response  to perceived  political,  economic  and social  problems.  Some of these
problems  are:  (a) the instability  of world market prices for the exnort
crops, resulting in fluctuations  in export revenues  and producers'  incomes;
(b)  conflicts over  the  distribution of  a%port  sales  revenues  between
exporters,  intermediaries  and producers;  (e) conflicts  over the distribution
of production;  and (d)  the  lack of  marketing  infrastructure.  The existence  of
specific  marketing  systems  can  also result  from  historical  causes  such  as: (a)
the newly-independent  countries  of Africa  wanting to acquire greater  control
over the marketing of their export crops;  or (b) arrangements  which reflect
the philosophy  of the ex-colonial  powers, such as in the case of cocoa the
creation of  Csisses in  francophone West  Africa  or  Marketing Boards  in
anglophone  East and West Africa.  For instance,  according  to Lamb  and Muller
(1982)  the formation  of the Kenya Tea Development  Authority (KTDA)  in Kenya
can be traced back to  the philosophy  of the British Colonial Development
Corporation in the early 19509.  Bates (1981), also points out that tIe
origins  of the state  marketing  agencies  lie in the colonial  period.
4.  To illustrate  the organization  and functions  of a typical  marketing
system, a hypothetical  marketing system  for coffee is shown in Figure  1.  As
illustrated, a  marketing  system  involves farmers,  traders,  processors,
exporters  and possibly  other agents.  The pricing  system  refers  to  how and  by
whom prices  at each  marketing  stage  are  determined  and  how payments  are made.Figure  1:  MARKETING  SYSTEM IN  A COFFEE-PRODUCING  'OUNTRY
Stages  Agencies  Involved
large  farms
Product  ion  and
Initiel  processing  (dry)  sma  older  estates
Collection  cooperative  trader
Initial  processing  (wet)  _
Assembling  tae/gn
Curing  cooperative  huller
(hulling,  grading)  union  (private  or  state)
I ntermed  i at  ion  auctions/brokers
Shipping  exporter
Roasting  dorestic  roasters
Distribution  holesalers  and
retailers
Consumption  Domestic  importing
consumer  J  countries
Source:  J.  de  Graaff  "The Economics  of  Coffee",  Pudoc  Wageningen,  1986.-4-
S.  Tables  1-4  show,  ir concise  form,  the  characteristics  of marketing
and  pricing  systems  for  coffee,  cocoa,  tea,  tobacco  and  cotton  1/ in  major
Sub-Saharan  exporters  of  -hese commodities.  The degree of government
involvement  in the  pricing  and  marketing  of these  export  commodities  varies
considerably  from  one  country  to another  and from  one  commodity  to  aiU1Lher.
The  systems  are  broadly  classified  into  three  categories;  the  marketing  board
system,  the "caisse  de stabilization"  system  and the free market  system.
While  ultimately  there  is  no differen.e  between  the  caisse  and  the  marketing
board  systems  in  terms  of the  control  exerted  by  government,  it  is  useful  to
distinguish  between them because  they can be  very different  in their
efficiency  and  in  the  changes  which  may  be  needed  to  mave  them  more  effective.
6.  A Marketing  Board  system  is characterized  by its  monopoly  in crop
marketing,  from  the  farmgate  to exports,  and  a pricing  system  controlled  by
the  government  board. Producer  prices  are  fixed  by  the  marketing  board. The
physical  handling  of the crop through  each stage  of commercialization  is
performed  by the  marketing  board,  in  which  ownership  is invested. In some
marketing  board  systems  a few  strictly-controlled  private  agents  are  involved,
usially  handling  a small  part  of  the  crop.
l/ These  five  commodities  comprise  over  702  of  the  total  agricultural  export
revenues  of  Sub-Saharan  countries  during  the  period  1984-86.TAfLE  la:  A SYNOPSIS  OF MANttETINC SiSTECS  FOl  COFFEE
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7.  The  Caisse  de  Stabilisation  system  is  the  same  as  the  marketing  board
system  in terms  of the  fixing  of producer  prices  and  legal  cwnership  of the
crop along the marketing  chain.  However,  the physical  handling  of the
commodiLies  from  the  farmgate  to  export  is  carried  out  on  the  Caisse's  behalf
by private  agents  licensed  by the  Caisse. Renumeration  for  each  marketing
service  performed  by the private  agents  is fixed  by the Caisse.  Export
activities  are  managed  by private  licensed  exporters  under  a  fixed  reference
export  price  and  on  terms  and  conditions  approved  by  the  Caisse.
8.  In the  Free  Market  system  the producer  price  is  determined  by the
world  market  price. There  is  no government  involvement  in  either  pricing  or
physical  handling  of  the  crop  at  any  stage  of  the  marketing  chain. The  use  of
the  term  free  market  does  not  imply  a completely  laissez-faire  approach.  The
government  may reserve  the right to intervene  if it perceives  a need to
coordinate  actions  of agents  in the system.  In practice,  however,  the
government'*  involvement  is  limited  to  quality  control,  grading,  taxation  and
general  supervision.
9.  Although  most  of  the  marketing  systems  can  be  classified  under  these
three  broad  categories,  an individual  coantry's  system  may vary  in certain
details.  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  representative  examples  of  each  system  will
be described  below.  Variations  of that system  will also be discussed.
Reference  can be made to Tables  1 through  4  to see differences  between
countries  for  each  of comodities.  The  countries  chosen  as representative  of
each  system are  Chana  (Marketing  Board), C6te  d'Ivoire (Caisse de
Stabilisation)  and  Madagascar  post-October  1988  (Free  Market).- 11 -
A.  The  Marketing  Board  System: Ghana  Cocoa  Marketing  Board
10.  The  Ghana  Cocoa  Marketing Board  (CMB)  controls all  stages of
marketing,  from purchases  at the farmgate  through  exports  or domestic  sales.
Sometimes the CMB authorizes the purchase  of cocoa beans from farmers by
agents  or  organizations operating under  license and  under  CMB's  close
supervision. The remuneration  of these  agents  is fixed  by the  CMB.  The CMB
sets  prices,  determines  the terms  and conditions  of purchase  and the  dates  of
opening  and closing  of the  cocoa  season.
11.  CMB purchases  are conducted through primary societies (at village
level) which are run by a produce buying clerk appointed by the regional
office of the Produce Buying Division  of CMB.  All farmers are obliged to
register  with their local  primary society.  Farmers  have some say in running
these societies.  The buying  clerk  buys cocoa from the farmers  in accordance
with terms and conditions set by the CMB and pays the farmers by check.
Farmers cash the check at the local bank where they are registered.  The
buying clerk is required to provide weekly reports concerning  details of
purchases  to the  regional  office  of the  Produce  Buying  Division.
12.  Grading and quality control are the responsibility  of the Produce
InsDection  Division  of the CMB.  Initial  grading  and bagging  of cocoa beans
takes place when they are purchased from the farmer.  Upon arrival  at CMB
central up-country storage the beans are regraded.  A final grading takes
place  upon arrival  at the port.  The markings  on the  bag identify  the  grower,
the grade of the beans, the inspector  who graded the beans and the primary- 12  -
society  which  bought  the  cocoa  from the farmer. Transportation  is  paid for  by
the  CMB.  The  CMB has  a monopoly  on cocoa  exports. Export  sales  are conducted
through  companies  under the direct control  and ownership  of the CMB.  These
companies  also market the cocoa products produced  by the state-owned  cocoa
processing  plants.
13.  Primary societies  are the major source  of credit to cocoa farmers.
These funds are channeled through district organizations  controlled  by the
Product Buying Division  of CMB.  CMB is also an important  direct source  of
finance  for  projects  such  as roads  in cocoa  growing  areas.
14.  Marketing  Board systems  very similar to the Ghana Cocoa Board are:
Nigeria  (cocoa) before  July  1986,  Cameroon (coffee and  cocoa)  in  the
anglophone  area,  Zimbabwe  (coffee,  cotton),  Kenya (tobacco),  Zambia  (tobacco),
Cameroon  (cotton),  Chad (cotton),  and Mali (cotton).
15.  There are several  marketing  systems  which do not strictly  fall into
the marketing board system as described above.  These systems have been
classified  here  as  marketing  board  systems  as  their  fundamental
characteristics  are the same.  These characteristics  are the ownership  of the
crop by the board and the major role that the parastatal  plays in fixing
producer prices and in the physical handling  of the crop.  The difference
between these systems and the marketing board system  as represented  by the
Ghana Cocoa Board is the larger role of private agent(s).  Two areas of
private involvement  can be identified:  (i)  collection/primary  processing;  and
(ii)  exporting.  Systems where  the  private sector  is  involved in  the- 13  -
collection/pricing  and processing are:  Burundi (coffee, collection only)
Uganda (coffee),  Ethiopia  (coffee),  and Rwanda (coffee).  Systems  where the
government parastatal controls all stages but allows private exporters to
handle exports are:  Tanzania (tea, tobacco and  cotton), Benin  (cotton),
Burkina Faso (cotton), and C6te d'Ivoire (cotton).  A  third category is
systems  wherein the  private  sector  is allowed  to participate  in both the  crop
collection/primary  processing  as well as in exporting.  Systems  falling  under
this category  are:  Tanzania  (coffee),  and Malawi (tea).  In these  two  cases,
exporters obtain the commodity for export through auctions.  In Tanzania
(tobacco)  exporters  purchase  the  commodity  for export  only from the  marketing
board  by private  treaty.
B.  Caisse  de Stabilisation:  C6te  d'Ivoire
16.  In CBte d'Ivoire the Caisse  de Stabilisation  (CSSPPA)  controls the
marketing  of cocoa  and coffee  primarily  through  two  measures:- 14 -
(i)  Specification  at the beginning of each crop year of the payment
system (bareme)  1/ which sets product  prices  and remuneration  for
marketing services at  each  step  along  the  cocoa  and  coffee
marketing chains from the producer to final sales (domestic and
exports).
(ii)  The use of an export  price refarence  system  to stabilize  the price
received by exporters.  If the world price is higher than the
reference  export price  as set by the CSSPPA, the exporter  makes a
payment to the CSSPPA equal to the difference between the two
prices.  If  the world  price  is  lower, then  the  exporter is
reimbursed  by the CSSPPA for the difference.  These payments  are
made from the  financial  reserves  of the  CSSPPA.
17.  Exporters  in C6te d'Ivoire  employ  traders (traitants)  to buy coffee
from the farmer.  The traders  provide  edditional  services  to the farmer  such
as credit and agricultural  inputs.  Importantly,  there is competition  among
traders buying from farmers.  Some farmers have farmed  cooperatives  to sell
their  products  directly  to  exporters or  to  large  traders.  However,
cooperatives  are at a disadvantage  to the traders  because  they cannot  provide
credit and other  services to the farmer.  All  traders are reimbursed by
amounts  fixed  under the bareme  by CSSPPA  for the services  they perform  on its
behalf.  The amount  of reimbursement  includes  a profit  margin  set  by the
1/  The details of the bareme  for C6te d'Ivoirc  cocoa  for the period  1979/88
are presented  in  Table  5.Table  5:  COTE  d'IVOIRE:  ESTIMATED  BALANCE  OF CSSPPA  AND  GOVERNMENT  FOR  COOA:  1979/80-1978/88
1979/80  1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88
----------------------------------------- (CFAFA(G)--------------------------------------------
Producer  Price  300.0  300.0  300.0  300.0  350.0  375.0  400.0  400.0  400.0
Local  Collection  (cherry)
Storage  and  Handling  Cost  15.4  17.0  19.2  20.9  23.2  24.1  25.1  25.1  25.0
Marketing,  Processing
Transportation  & Storage  Cost  30.6  33.0  37.0  40.8  44.5  44.7  51.2  51.7  53.1
Export  Tax  50.6  50.6  50.6  50.6  80.5  80.5  80.5  100.5  100.5
Exporter's  Profit  2.1  2.3  2.4  3.3  3.3  3.3  2.9  2.5  3.3
Port  Handling  Cost  2.3  2.7  2.7  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.5  3.8  3.5
f.O.B.  Value  401.1  405.6  411.9  418.9  504.8  530.9  563.2  583.6  584.4
Freight  & Insurance  44.0  49.0  51.0  51.0  58.1  66.8  76.0  73.7  73.7
C.I.F.  Value  445.0  454.6  462.9  469.9  562.9  597.7  639.2  657.3  659.1
Costs  Hors  Bareme  /a  35.0  35.0  3.50  35.0  39.9  42.7  33.3  33.3  32.3
Total  Cost  to  CSSPPA  480.0  489.6  497.9  504.9  602.8  640.4  672.5  690.6  691.4
Actual  C.I.F.  Value  627.6  510.0  595.0  651.4  876.5  992.9  864.3  705.9  571.5  /b
Balance  of  CSSPPA  147.6  20.4  97.1  146.5  273.7  352.5  191.8  15.3  -119.9
Balance  of  Government  198.2  71.0  147.7  197.1  354.2  433.0  272.3  115.8  -19.4
/a The  export  tax  has  been  raised  from  23%  of  the  "valeur  mercuriale"  for  the  crops  1980/81-1985/86  to  25.125%  for  the  1986/87  crop.
/b  Estimated  by International  Commodity  Markets  Division.
Source: CSSPPA.- 16 -
CBSPPA. The  payments  are  in  cash. Exporters  are  obliged  to  submit  a weekly
report  of  their  purchases  to  CSSPPA.
18.  Traders  do not grade  beans but pay uniform  prices  for  all beans
regardless  of quality. Exporters  clean,  dry,  grade  and re-bag  the beans.
C'e-n  in that process,  however,  good and bad quality  beans are mixed.
TrLnsportation  is provided  by the trader. The  allowance  for transportation
cost  is  set  by  the  bareme.
19.  The majority  of the arrangements  for shipping  and selling  cocoa
abroad  are  handled  by  private  export  firms.  However,  CSSPPA  allocates  a  quota
for each exporter  and all transactions  are supervised  and approved  by the
CSSPPA. Storage  costs  are  paid  by  the  exporter. The  exporter  is  reimbused
for  storage  costs  through  the  bareme.
20.  The  main  source  of  pre-export  finance  for  the  farmer  is  the  trader.
Large  traders  use  their  own  funds  while  smaller  traders  obtain  funds  for  this
purpose  through  large  exporters.  The  terms  of  the  loan  are  negotiated  by  the
farmer  and  the  trader.  The  cocoa  exporter  relies  on  the  central  bank  or  other
banks  for  pre-export  finance.
21.  Marketing  systems  that are similar  to that of C6te d'Ivoire  are
Cameroon  (coffee  and  cocoa  in  the  francophone  areas)  and  Madagascar  (coffee)
pre-October  1988. However,  there  are  some  differences.  In  Cameroon,  but  more
so  in  Madagascar,  the  government  has  (or  had)  even  greatte  involvement.- 17  -
22.  In Cameroon, buyers' activities are more controlled  than in C6te
d'Ivoire.  The government  controls  the purchase  of the crop not only through
the  fixed  purchase  price  as  in  C6te  d'Ivoire  but  also  through  (a)
determination  of the  geographical  area  where  each buyer  is  allowed  to purchase
beans;  (b)  fixing  the  day the  purchase  can take  place;  (c)  verification  of the
quality of the crop purchased;  and sometimes  (d) through  arranging  for crop
transportation.  In contrast to C6te d'Ivoire, the government,  through its
parastatal  (ONCPB),  participates  in grading  of the crop.  All overseas  sales
in Cameroon  are made by the caisse,  with exporters  acting  as its agents.  In
contrast,  in C6te d'Ivoire  private  exporters  are permitted  to negotiate  their
overseas  sales,  subject  to approval  by the  caisse.
23.  In the pre-October  1988 coffee marketing system of Madagascar the
government fixed the purchase price and the purchase  arrangements  between
farmers  and  buyers  were supervised  by representatives  of the  group  of villages
(fokontany) and  by  the  field  agents  of  the  Price  Stabilization Funds
(CAVAGI). On the export  side,  80%  of the trade volume  was physically  handled
by parastatals  and 20% by private  enterprises. Export  sales  were  arranged  by
CAVAGI.  After CAVAGI had  sold the coffee, it assigned one of the four
parastatal  companies (SOMACODIS,  ROSO, COROL and SICE) to handle the export
shipment.
C.  Free  Market:  Nigeria  Post-July  1986  (cocoa)
24.  Nigeria's post-July 1986 system relies exclusively  on the private
sector*  Farmers  sell  to  private  exporters  directly  or  through- 18  -
intermediaries.  The  producer price  is  determined by  supply and  demand
conditions in the domestic market.  Quality control and transportation  is
performed  by the  upcountry  purchaser  of the  cocoa.
25.  Other  free market  systems include the  post-October 1988 coffee
marketing system in Madagascar,  Zaire (coffee), Zimbabwe (tobacco),  Malawi
(estate  tobacco),  and, in philosophy,  Kenya (coffee  and tea).  The marketing
systems of Madagascar;  Zaire and Nigeria have changed considerably  in the
1980s.  A description  of the changes  is presented  in Section  III.  Government
involvement  in coffee  and tea marketing in Kenya  has been kept to a minimum,
with reliance  on the  free  market. Annex II presents  a detailed  description  of
Kenya's  marketing  and pricing  system  for both  coffee  and tea.- 19  -
II.  PROBLEMS  IN  MARKETING  AND PRICING  EXPORT  COMIODITIES
IN SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA
26.  The marketing and pricing systems for agricultural  commodities  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa have attracted attention in recent years because of the
poor  performance of  these  exports in  most  of  these  countries.  Real
agricultural  commodity  export  revenues  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  fell sharply  in
the early to mid-1980s  and have remained  at about  one-half  that of the 1970s
(see  Chart 1).
27.  Another  development  in the agriculcural  export sector  over the last
three decades is that the region's reliance  on a few comnodities,  coffee,
cocoa and cotton,  has increased.  1/  This increased  dependence  has  meant  that
the  export  revenues  of many  Sub-Saharan  countries  have  become  more susceptible
to fluctuations  in  world  prices  for  these  few  commodities.
28.  Mainly because  of these developments,  marketing  and pricing  systems
for the major  agricultural  export  crops  have been severely  tested  with regard
to their ability to adjust to the sudden market disruptions.  This section
presents a  list of the problems  which have arisen during t  ?cent  years, and
classifies them into three categories--those  related directly to government
involvement, and  those  related  to  the  pricing and  marketing  systems
themselves.
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A.  Problems  Related  to Government  Po'licies  and  AcLions
29.  Problems arising in  the  marketing and  pricing systems due  to
government  policies  and other  actiors  can be classified  into those  related  to
the  functions the government assigns to  the marketing organizations  and
pricing systems  and those  related  to macro-economic  policies  which impact  on
the  marketing  and pricing  systems.
30.  It is clear  that the  marketing  organizations  for specific  commodities
exist because these commodities  are important  in some ways to the countries
and  governments.  Although it might  be convenient and efficient in some
respects  to create  these organizations,  it should  be borne in mind that the
existence  of such  organizations  can lead  to important  problems.
31.  Because of  the  importance of  these  crops  within  the  country,
especially  in terms  of export  and fiscal  revenues,  there  tends  to be important
political interventions  in managing the marketing organizations  and forming
policies affecting the  sector.  As  a  result there are  cases where  the
marketing boards and the sector receive resources above the optimal level
(i.e., they  are  subsidized) and  in  other  cases  they  receive resources
substantially  below the optimal level, (i.e., they are heavily  taxed).  In
both  cases  this  leads  to  distorted and  inefficient development of  the
country's  agricultural sector  and  often  results  in  neglect  of  other
potentially  exportable  commodities. The fact  remains  that  Sub-Sahara's- 22 -
increased  reliance  on a  few  commodities  1/ implies  failure  of these  countries
to diversify  their  agricultural  export  coimodities. This inability  to develup
other export-competitive  activities may be as much reiated to the bias in
infrastructure  (such as transport,  research  and extension)  towards  existing
crops  as to overvalued  exchange  rates  or other  macro-economic  distortions.
32.  A weak private sector is frequently  given as the raison  d'etre for
parastatal  marketing organizations.  But the existence of marketing boards
with government-empowered  monopolistic  status impedes  the development  of the
private  sector.
33.  The assignment  of several  objectives  (social  as well as economic)  to
marketing organizations lead  to  difficulties because in  many  cases  the
objectives  conflict. The  problem  of conflicting  objectives  is a pervasive  one
with government  entities.
34.  Bates (1981) notes that in many Sub-Saharan  countries  where state
marketing  agencies  exist,  the government  has diverted  an increasing  share of
funds from the stabilization  of agricultural  prices and diversification  of
production to the capital investment  fund of the national government.  He
cites the cases of Senegal in 19'4 and Cote d'Ivoire  in 1980.  Bates'  point
can also be applied to the experiences  of Ghana and Nigeria  in cocoa during
1/  The  combined share of coffee and  cocoa in Sub-Saharan  Africa's total
agricultural  export revenue increased from 31.7% in 1961-63 to 40.6% in
1971-73 and  to 54.4%  in 1984-86 (see Table 3  in Akiyama and Larson
(1989)).- 23 -
the 1970.  and early 1980s.  Commander  (1989)  also points  out that one of the
main factors  in restraining  growth,  in Sub-Saharan  Africa is the use  of price
controls  and  production  taxes  as a method  to redistribute  income  away from  the
sector.
35.  Macroeconomic  policies  which  affect  the  marketing  and pricing  system
profoundly and which have been put  under close  scrutiny by  policymakers
recently  are exchange  rate and export tax policies.  Although several  Sub-
Saharan countries have devalued their currencies in real terms in recent
years,  the  weighted  average  of their  currencies  is still  over-valued  relative
to those  of other  major agricultural  commodity  exporting  countries  (see  Chart
2). 1/  Cleaver (1985)  and Commander (1989) suggest that one of the major
causes  for the poor performance  of agriculture  exports in Sub-Saharan  Africa
is the poor price and exchange rate policies.  Cleaver finds considerable
variation  between  African  countries  in regard  to these  policies.
36.  If a country wants to maintain its competitiveness  at a time when
world  prices  of its  commodity  export(s)  are low, it basically  has three  policy
options,  i.e.,  reducing  production  costs,  a real devaluation,  and subsidizing
(or reduce taxes on) production  of the commodity.  When the option  of real
devaluation  aimed at  increasing competitiveness  of  export crops is being
considered,  the magnitude  of the devaluation  needs to be evaluated  by taking
into account all the variables relevant to the commodity  concerned.  These
variables include the  productivity growth, exchange rates, inflation and
export  taxes  of other  countries  which export  that commodity  and secular  world
l/  For the case of the francophone  countries  their  currencies  have not been
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import demand  trends as  well as  the  global import price elasticity of
demand. Preferably,  a global  model  of the  commodity  which incorporates  all of
these  variables  should  be used to evaluate  the impact  of real exchange  rate
changes  on the  country's  production,  export  quantities  and export  revenues.  1/
37.  Marketing  and pricing  systems  almost  invariably  function  poorly  when
exchange rates  are  over-valued and/or export  taxes  on  commodities are
unreasonably  high. 2/  The end result  is lowered  production,  contributing  to
financial losses and  liquidity problems in  the  marketing organizations.
Numerous  examples  exist  of the deleterious  effects  of such policies  on export
crops in Sub-Saharan  Africa, including  Ghana's cocoa sector in the 1970.,
Madagascar's  coffee  sector  in recent  years,  Sudan's  cotton  sector  during  the
late 1970.  and early 1980s,  Tanzania's  cotton  sector  during  the early 1980s,
and Nigeria's  cocoa  and  cotton  sectors  in the  early  1980s.
B.  Problems  Related  to the Pricing  and Payment  Systems
38.  The sharp  fall in most agricultural  commodity  prices  in  world  markets
in recent years and the significant  depreciation  of the US dollar against
other major  currencies resulted in a  sharp reduction in  export prices,
especially in real local currency  terms, in the second half of the 1980s.
1/  Such  an approach  has  been taken  recently  by the  Bank for  several  countries
and  for several commodities.  They include coffee and cocoa for C6te
d'Ivoire, coffee for  Kenya and Ethiopia and palm oil and rubber for
Indonesia.
2/  For  example,  see the  case  of Nigeria  in Scherr  (1989).- 26 -
Under these circumstances,  many countries  which adopted a  system of fixed
producer  prices have had to subsidize  producers.  This has led to financial
difficulties  in the  budgets  of these  marketing  organizations  as well as of the
national  governments. Examples  of such situations  are cocoa in C6te d'Ivoire
and  Cameroon and  coffee in Rwanda since  1986, most  Sub-Saharan cotton-
producing  countries in 1986, and cocoa in Chana and Nigeria in the early
1980..
39.  Singh et al  (1985) noted that the problem of "getting the price
right"  is a major one when prices  are administered. They go further  to point
out that when administered  pricing systems  go awry it is usually  not because
the  objectives  of the system  are  unclear,  which  could  be the  case,  but  because
the quantitative  effects of the system  are "...inadequately  understood  and
measured."
40.  Under the Marketing Board and Caisse systems producer prices are
usually held stable from one year to another,  which is intended  to protect
farmers  from wide fluctuations  in world prices  and ensure  stable  incomes. As
shown  for selected  commodities  in Table  6, real producer  prices  in countries
where  pricing  systems  are under  the  control  of marketing  boards  or caisses  are
considerably  more stable  than  where  world prices  are freely  transmitted  to the
farmers. Although  stable  producer  price  systems  may be desirable  for  risk-- 27 -
Table  6:  COEFFICIENT  OF VARIABILITY  OF  REAL PRODUCER  PRICES
AND  WORLD  PRICES  (expressed  in  domestic  currency  terms
and  deflated  by the  CPI)
Real  Real  /a
Producer  World
Price  Price  Ratio
Cocoa
C6te  d'Ivoire  6.11  82.44  7.4
Cameroon  2.93  70.22  4.2
Ghana  6.11  37.52  16.3
Nigeria  12.42  32.83  37.8
Brazil  *  /b  17.49  16.36  106.9
Coffee
C6te  d'Ivoire  4.43  109.40  4.0
Cameroon  4.56  91.80  5.0
Ethiopia  *  8.53  21.75  39.2
Kenya  *  49.05  48.71  100.7
Tanzania  3.81  10.4  36.6
Madagascar  4.82  47.32  10.2
Rwanda  11.44  88.22  13.0
Zaire  7.30  26.73  27.3
Burundi  2.45  17.08  14.3
Uganda  11.88  36.66  32.4
/a  World  price  multiplied  by the  domestic  exchange  rate  and  divided  by the
CPI.
/b  Brazil  is included  to provide  a comparison  since  other  than  the  post-1986
Nigerian  system  no other  cocoa  marketing  system  in  SSA  freely  transmits
world  price  movements  to producer  prices.
*  Producer  prices  linked  to the  world  price.Table  7:  AEAL PRODUCER  PRICES AS PERCENTAGE  OF WORLD PRICES  (expressed  in  domestic
currency  terms  and  deflated  by  the  CPI)
1968-1988  1970-1979  1980-1988
S  S 
Coffee
C6te d'Ivoire  37.7  35.9  37.8
Cameroon  40.2  35.8  42.3
Madagascar  32.3  33.0  27.4
Kenya  *  88.2  90.3  85.4
Ethiopia  *  51.3  52.0  43.1
Rwanda  43.8  38.2  50.9
Piurund i  42.5  39.8  46.8
Tanzania  64.0  63.0  56.3
Zaire  31.3  30.5  31.7
Uganda  34.5  27.1  37.8
Cocoa
Cote  dlvoire  44.2  41.9  50.2
Cameroon  41  34.9  52.3
Ghana  45.3  38.5  62.9
Nigeria  52  45.9  81.6
Brazil  *  /a  76  71.1  84.4
/a  BraziI  Is  Included  to  provide  a  comparison  since  other  then  the  post-1986  Nigerian  system  no  other  cocoa  marketing  system
In  SSA  freely  transmits  world  price  movements  to  producer  prices.
*  Producer  prices  linked  to  the  world  price.- 29 -
averse farmers, 1/ governments  might be forced to make drastic changes in
producer  prices  if world  prices  of commodities  fall sharply  and remain  at low
levels  for prolonged  periods,  as governments  usually  cannot  subsidize  farmers
indefinitely. Such was the case in Cote d'Ivoire  and Can -oon in 1989  when
producer  prices  of coffee  and cocoa  were reduced  by 50x.  2/
41.  A rigidly-fixed  producer  price  system  has  other important  drawbacks--
e.g., the inability  to transmit  market signals  to producers,  which creates
distorted price incentives  among commodities.  This is especially  the case
when  producer prices are  determined by  political considerations.  When
producer  prices  are  maintained  at a fixed  level  while  world  prices  decline  for
an extended period, the country is effectively  encouraging  production  of a
commodity  whose  relative  world  demand  is declining. This transmits  subsidies
from the producing  country  to the importing  countries'  consumers.  Moreover,
when marketing  organizations  or governments  subsidize  a comnodity,  production
and exports  of other  commodities  are discriminated  against.  This discourages
efficient diversification  of  production  and exports.  On  the other hand,
keeping producer  prices  fixed at levels  well below world prices  can prevent
the  industry from responding to world market opportunities  which may  be
signalled  by increases  in  world  prices.
1/  According  to Newbery  and Stiglitz  (1981),  a reduction  in price variation
increases producers'  welfare but this does not necessarily  imply that
production  would be higher  with more stable  prices.  In fact, they show
that if producers  were very risk averse, production  would increase  with
unstable  prices.
2/  A  number of governments  have shown reluctance  to change from a  fixed
producer  pricing  system  to a more flexible  one, in spite  of the problems
the former system  has been facing in recent  years.  Annex III discusses
how such a transition  could be made without  too much disruption  in light
of the  recent  experience  in some  countries.- 30  -
42.  The  Caisse  system  of fixing  costs  of services  at  almost  every  stage
of  marketing  leads  to  guarantees  of  profits  to  the  private  agents  involved  and
provides  little  incentive  for  them  to  become  more  efficient.  Large  monopoly
rents  may  be  made  by  private  agents  if  new  entrants  into  these  activities  are
limited.  However,  this  system  may  still  be  more  efficient  than  the  Marketing
Board  system  which  is  wholly  government-controlled,  and  where  there  may  well
be no  incentives  for increased  efficiency  in the various  links of the
marketing  chain.
43.  Problems  with  producer  pricing  and  payments  are  not  restricted  to  the
Marketing  Board  and  Caisse  systems.  Irregular  and  delayed  payments  to  coffee
producers  have  occurred  in Kenya  which  basically  has a free-market  system.
These administrative  problems  have had negative  effects  on production  and
quality.
C. Problems  Related  to  the  Marketing  System
44.  Problems  common  to Marketing  Boards  and Caisses  arise  principally
because  these  organizations  tend  to become  over-staffed  bureaucracies  which
operate  inefficiently  and  are  unable  to  adjust  readily  to  changes  in  domestic
and international  market  developments.  This  has been  a serious  drawback  in
recent  years  when  the  location  of  expanding  market  opportunities,  (e.g.,  East
Asia) and types  and qualities  of commodities  demanded  have been changing
rapidly.  Sub-Saharan  marketing  organizations  have  mostly  put emphasis  on
production,  and  they  have  very  limited  expertise  in  marketing  their  products
in new  markets  and adjusting  to  new  market  needs. Marketing  departments  of- 31 -
these organizations  are usually ill-equipped  and their staff  are not trained
adequately.  As a result  they  lack the  necessary  information  and  experience  to
react  to  developments  in the  world  commodity  markets.  1/
45.  Apart from forward sales,  the use of financial instruments  such as
options  and futures  markets is  extremely  limited  as a means  of risk  management
by the Sub-Saharan  Africa parastatals. The use of these  market instruments
has proven quite beneficial for other countries,  such as coffee and cocoa
exporters in Brazil  and Costa Rica,  as a means of hedging  risks rather  than
for speculative  purposes  (the  latter  can prove  financially  disastrous). With
new  financial instruments  becoming more widely used, it is not now only
possible for marketing organizations  to hedge risks, but also for them to
obtain  financing  in  a commodity-linked  fashion.  2/
46.  Large marketing boards  have tended  to lose accountability  and often
are  run  in  a  nonprofessional  manner.  Many of  them lack the necessary
technical staff to evacuate, transport, grade, process and  export in an
efficient  manner.  Almost  all of these  problems  can be attributed  to the fact
1/  Many marketing  organizations  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  lack fundamental  tools
like market  monitoring  services  and modern  communication  facilities. For
a number  of parastatal  market  organizations  the salaries  paid are low  and
there are very few incentives  for advancement.  A notable exception in
this area is Ethiopia's  Coffee  Marketing  Corporation  (ECMC)  whose salary
scale  is higher  than that  applying  to the  government  sector.
2/  A marketing  board could borrow  money with the rate of interest  linked  to
the price of the commodities  that it markets.  There is developing  an
extensive  literature  on this  subject;  however,  it is beyond  the  purpose  of
this  paper  to go into  more  details.  For  more information  in this  area see
Priovolos  (1987),  Priovolos  and  Duncan  (1989),  Rolfo  (1980),  among  others.- 32 -
that  neither Marketing  Boards  nor Caisses  are profit-oriented  organizations.
Transportation  problems  are prevalent  in countries  such as Uganda,  Tanzania,
Ghana and Sudan.  Processing is reportedly unsatisfactory for coffee in
Ethiopia and  Uganda and  for cotton and  tobacco in Tanzania.  Inadequate
supervision  of grading  has been  reported  in cocoa  in  Nigeria  and in tobacco  in
Tanzania.
47.  Marketing boards  often  are  also  responsible for  deliveries of
agricultural inputs to farmers.  Untimely deliveries of  inputs have been
reported  in  Tanzania's  coffee  and  tobacco  sectors  and Sudan's  cotton  sector.
48.  Apart from the issue  of quality,  a country's  export  price  for  a crop
is affected  by the following  factors:  (a) timely  delivery  of the crop, (b)
consistency  in the  quality  of the  product,  and (c)  availability  of the  crop in
reasonable  quantities.  There are a  number  of cases  where these  factors  have
affected  a country's  position  in the  world market.  Variations  in quality  of
coffee  delivered by Madagascar  under the Caisse system  and cocoa  and coffee
from  C6te  d'Ivoire  have  affected  their  position  in  the  world  market.
Furthermore,  the recent  irregularities  in cocoa  shipments  from Cate d'Ivoire,
which  was  a result  of the  caisse's  interventions  in terms  of export  prices  and
quantities,  have led cocoa bean processors  in Europe  and North American to
switch towards other cocoas, particularly  Malaysian cocoa, as a  means of
assuring  themselvus  of a constant  flow  of cocoa  beans.- 33 -
III:  USCMfT DVEWLOPMNTS  IN  KARKETINC  AND PRICINC SYSTEMS
49.  Prompted  by the  problems  discussed  in Section  II,  several  Sub-Saharan
African  countries  have undertaken  or are examining  changes  of varying  degrees
in their  marketing  and  pricing  systems. There  are five  kinds  of changes  which
have occurred or are  proposed.  They are: (a) abolition of the existing
marketing system  and complete  privatization,  (b) partial privatization,  (c)
changes  in the  pricing  system,  (d)  streamlining  the operations  of the  existing
system,  and (e) formation  or strengthening  of auction  markets.  Large real
exchange  rate  devaluation  should  also be included  because  of its  impact  on the
performance  of  the marketing system.  Reduction in export taxes is also
another  change that affects the performance  of marketing systems.  However,
for  most Sub-Saharan  marketing  systems  the explicit  export  taxation  is rather
small while  the  implicit export taxation (subsidization),  via  controlled
prices,  is the  major  issue  and covered  under  category  (c).  Table  8 summarizes
the  recent  developments.
50.  (a)  Abolition of  the  existing marketing system and  complete
privatization. The only countries  that fall in this category  are Madagascar
and Nigeria.  In the case of Madagascar  the  marketing  board  remained  but was
privatized  and its  monopoly  powers  revoked.
51.  (b)  Partial privatization. Under partial  privatization,  only some
parts  of  the  marketing network have  been privatized, leaving the  basic
structure  of the  system  virtually  unchanged. More specifically,  partialTable  8:  RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  MARKETING  SYSTEMS  Of  SSA
Total  Streamling  the
Privatization  Changes  Operations
of the  in  the  of the  Forming  or  Large  Real
Marketing  Partial  Pricing  Existing  Strengthening  Exchange  Rate
Commodities  Board  Privatization  System  System  of Auction  Devaluations
Coffee  and/or  Cocoa
Madagascar  x  x
Nigeria  x  x  x  (1986)
C6te  d'lIvoire  x (P)  x  (P)  x
Cameroon  x  (P)  x IP)  x
Ghana  x (P)  x  (1983)
Burundi  x  (P)  x (P)  x  (P)  x  (P)
Uganda  x (P)  x
Kenya  x (P)
Ethiopia  x (P)  x (P)
Tanzania  x (P)  x (P)  x (P)  x (1986)
Zaire  x  x  x  (1984)
Cotton
Mali  x  x
Chad  x  x
(P)  = Proposed.- 35  -
privatization  includes  the increasing  participation  of the private sector  in
domestic  marketing  and exporting  and/or transferring  ownership  of processing
facilities  from the parastatals  to the private  sector.  Cases that fall into
this category are:  Ghana  (coffee), Burundi (coffee), Uganda  (coffee),
Ethiopia  (coffee),  Zaire (coffee),  Mali (cotton)  and  Tanzania  (cotton). Zaire
and Mali are the or.ly  cases where the changes have been implemented;  the
others  are  under  consideration.
52.  (c)  Changes  in the pricing  system. This  category  includes  countries
which have moved  or propose  to move from  a fixed  producer  pricing  system  to  a
more flexible producer pricing system reflecting  market conditions.  These
countries are Madagascar,  Nigeria,  Mali and Chad.  For Burundi there is a
proposal under consideration  to move gradually to a more market-determined
producer  pricing  system. This category  also includes  Kenya's  improved,  market
-determined,  pricing  system.
53.  (d)  Streamlining  the  operations  of  the  existing  system.
Streamlining includes operations aimed  at  cutting costs  and  increasing
efficiency.  Streamlining  of operations has recently taken place in C6te
d'Ivoire  and Cameroon  (mainly  staff reductions  for these tw3 cases),  Uganda,
Mali and  Chad.
54.  (e)  Forming or  strengthening  of  auction systems.  For  several
countries it has been proposed  to form or enhance  existing  auction  systems.
Burundi (coffee), Ethiopia  (coffee)  and Tanzania (coffee)  are the cases in
point.- 36  -
55.  The remainder of this section presents in more detail the recent
developments  in the  marketing  systems  mentioned  above.
(i)  Nigeria  (Cocoa)
56.  In  Nigeria  real  cocoa  producer  prices  declined  due  to  the
appreciation  of the Naira in the wake of the 1970s oil boom.  As a result,
production  declined  from  250,000  tons in the  early 1970s  to about  100,000  tons
in the mid-1980s.  Beginning in 1985 the government  of Nigeria adopted a
number of measures  to reverse the decline in producticn  of cooca,  as well as
other non-petroleum  based products, in order to alleviate the balance of
payments  deficit caused by increased  debt service and low oil prites.  In
October of 1985 Nigeria entered into discussion  with the IMF to obtain a
structural adjustment loan (SAL) for the  agricultural sector.  The most
important measure was  the adoption of a  more appropriate exchange rate.
Between  1973 and 1980 the Naira had apprecieted  against  the  US dollar  by 80Z
in real terms.  In 1986, the Naira depreciated  by over 60Z against the US
dollar.  Another measure  taken  for  promotion of  cocoa  production was
restructuring  of  the marketing system.  The  prevailing thought was  that
Nigeria's  vibrant private  sector  could  assume  marketing  responsibilities  more
efficiently  than  the  Marketing  Board.- 37  -
57.  In 1986 the Nigerian Cocoa Board (NCB)  was abolished  and the crop
purchasing  system was deregulated.  1/  The produce inspection  and quality
control  procedures  employed  by NCB  were  abandoned  and the licensing  system  for
crop buyers  was dissolved.  Export tride  licenses  were also abolished.  The
new marketing  system  relies  exclusively  on private  traders  and exporters. At
first, there was deterioration  in the quality of the cocoa beans marketed
since there  were no provisions  for grading  and quality  control  after  NCB was
abolished.  However, the  main  reason for  quality deterioration  was  the
existence  of exchange  rate controls  which created  a high premium  for foreign
exchange  and led exporters to enter into the cocoa  business  n order to get
access to hard currency  which could be exchanged  in the parallel  market for
huge profits.  Domestic  buyers purchased  any type of cocoa,  no matter the
quality.  As a  result the overwhelming  demand for cocoa increased cocoa
producer prices ten-fold between 1986 and  1989.  This distortion of the
marketing system was  removed largely as a  result of the decision of the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to liberalize  foreign  exchange  and to squeeze
liquidity in the banking system, making it difficult for buyers to obtain
1/  According to a recent  article  which  appeared  in the West Africa  magazine
(December  18-24,  1989)  the  Nigerian  government's determination to
privatize  its parastatals  gained  more impetus  after it was found that 32
out  of the 35 parastatals  owed a  staggering  US$3.2 billion.  It was
determined that the  parastatals  have not been  run with  profit as  a
motive.  Reasons attributed to  the  bad  performance were:  (a)  the
inadequate  or non-provision  of working  capital  at establishment;  (b)  wrong
or inadequate  capital base; (c) limited  power of the parastatals  to set
prices  for  their products or  services; (d) a  mixture of  social and
commercial  objectives  in the  operation  of some  or all the  parastatals;  (e)
lack  of  corporate authority in  hiring or  firing personnel and  the
inability  to  pay  market  salaries  for  staff;  and  (f)  lack  of
professionalism  on the  part of the  management  in running  their  operations
efficiently.  The government has formed committees  which will oversee
privatization  or drastic  reforms  in the  various  parastatals.- 38 -
credit for  their purchases.  On  response to complaints from buyers and
manufacturers in  the  European markets  (in  particular,  in  London)  the
government  re-introduced  a grading  and quality  control  system. The government
charges a  fee for this service.  However,  a  private sector alternative  to
government quality control has emerged.  Societe Generale de  Surveillance
Holding S.A., a  leading international  firm in the area of inspection  and
evaluation,  has  been playing  an increasingly  active  role in  exporting  Nigerian
cocoa.
(ii)  Madagascar  (Coffee)
58.  In Madagascar,  the government  realized  that the  marketing  system  was
not generating  the expected  revenues  due to inefficiencies  in its operations.
Because of the existence of the Caisse type of marketing system,  there was
private sector involvement  in the marketing  chain.  In 1988, the government
decided to hand over all marketing  operations  to the private  sector  but, at
the same time, to build safeguards  into the new system in order to protect
export revenues,  the repatriation  of foreign  exchange  from export  activities,
and its  export  tax  revenues.
59.  The  new  coffee marketing system in operation since October 1988
relies  on  private agents and  the  free  transmission of  world  prices to
producers.  There is a minimal  degree  of government  involvement.- 39  -
60.  Under the  new system  farmers  sell coffee  to collectors  (private)  who
sell the  parchment coffee to  either the  exporters or  to  "conditioneurs
stockeurs".  The hulling of the coffee is performed  by the exporters,  the
"conditioneurs  stockeurs"  or the farmers  themselves. The farmer  has also,  the
option  of hiring  the  services  for  hulling  from  the  "conditioneur  stockeur"  for
a fee, and subsequently  selling  the green coffee to an exporter.  The four
parastatals  that were previously  assigned  to handle the bulk of exportable
coffee  now act as private  exporting firms (although  still  government  owned)
competing  with other private exporters.  Initially,  ICO export stamps (when
the ICO export quota system  was operative)  were issued  on a first-come  basis
with stock verification  at the exporter's  warehouse.  In January 1989 the
quota allocation system was  changed.  If the quota system is to be re-
introduced,  ICO export  stamps  will be allocated  solely  on the basis  of stock
1 vei.
61.  The  pricing  system  is  based  on the  world  price,  but  in order  to avoid
underinvoicing  of exports,  a "reference  price"  for exports is established  by
the Commite Nacional de Cafe. 1/  This committee  consists  of all exporters
including  CAVAGI. 2/  This price is based on a formula  using robusta  coffee
prices  in London  and  Marseille  and  adjusting  for  freight  and other  costs. The
"reference price" is subject to weekly revision.  The exporter has to pay
taxes  on,  and  repatriate earnings from,  coffee exporters based  on  the
1/  This system  is similar  to the  "reintegro"  system  in Colombia.
2/  CAVAGI  is the former  stabilization  fund for coffee,  vanilla  and cloves,  a
Caisse equivalent,  which under the current system  has become  a trading
company  on behalf  of the  government,  but  acting  more as a private  entity.- 40 -
"reference  price".  If  the  realization  price  is  lower,  the  exporter  covers  the
difference.  If  it  is  higher,  the  exporter  can  choose  to  keep  the  difference.
Prices  to  intermediaries  and  farmers  depend  on  domestic  demand  and  supply  for
coffee. There  are  no controls  on either  the  producer  price  or intermediary
prices.
(iii) Zaire  (Coffee)
62.  In  1977,  after  a period  of  stagnation  in  agricultural  production  and
revenues,  the government  of Zaire started  a process  of restructuring  the
agriculture  sector.  In 1979 the Office  National  du Cafe,  the government
marketing  board  for  coffee  set  up in  1972,  was  replaced  by  the  Office  Zairois
du Cafe (OZACAF),  a  government  organization  supervising  the coffee  sector.
OZACAF's  role  in coffee  marketing  is  that  of a private  dealer  and  buyer  of
last  resort.  Presently,  most of the  marketing  network  is in the private
sector's  hands. OZACAF  acts  mostly  in  the  area  of  grading,  quality  control,
and processing  on behalf  of smallholders.  For  its  services  in the  areas  of
quality  control  and grading,  OZACAF  collects  4.5X  of the export  price.  1/
However, in  the processing  sector there is  also the  private sector
alternative.  Moreover,  the private  exporters'  role  in processing  is
increasing,  replacing  OZACAF  because  of its  greater  efficiency.  OZACAF  also
exports  coffee  but  does  not  have  a monopoly  over  exports.  Most  of  the  coffee
is  exported  through  private  traders.  However,  exporters  need  the  approval  of
1/ This  fee  is  considered  quite  high  since  costs  of  OZACAP's  operations  could
be  covered  with  just  0.5X  of  the  export  price. A fee  for  similar  services
in  Costa  Rica  is  only  1%  of  the  export  price.- 41 -
OZACAF  before  they  complete  an export  transaction. When the  ICO  coffee  export
quota system was  in operation,  OZACAF handled the distribution  of export
stamps.
63.  Despite the liberalization,  the government  frequently  intervenes  in
the coffee trade through various rules and regulations.  As a result, the
system of rules and regulations  is very complex; there is a total of 54
regulations  governing  activity between the farmgate and export.  The World
Bank  has, as part of its loan conditionality,  set a requirement  to reduce  the
54 procedures to 26  because of the disincentives  they pose to efficient
trade. However,  even  26 regulations  are still  too  much.
64.  The  producer  pricing  system  has  also been changed. Starting  in 1982,
the producer  price for coffee  has been market-determined,  rather  than set by
the government. With the removal  of price  contols  and the  devaluation  of the
currency  by 290%, (in real terms)  in 1983, coffee  producer  prices increased
rapidly--doubling  in real terms between 1982 and 1987.  The export pricing
system  is similar  to the  pricing  system  now in place in  Madagascar. There is
a reference  price, called  "valeur  mercurial",  which determines  the price on
which taxes  and fees  are paid  and foreign  exchange  earnings  are  repatriated  to
the  Central  Bank.  This reference  price  is the  weekly  average  for  arabica  (or
robusta)  prices  in  New York  and is set  every  week. 1/
1/  Zaire  produces  88%  robusta  and 12%  arabica.- 42 -
(iv)  Burundi  (Coffee)
65.  The government  of Burundi,  with technical  assistance  from the  World
Bank,  is beginning  a process  of gradual  privatization  of the coffee  marketing
system. The government's  motivation  was similar  to  Madagascar's--an  awareness
of the inefficiencies  that existed  in the present  marketing  system.  In the
case of Burundi,  however,  there was no private  sector  to speak of and the
government  opted  for a gradual  privatization,  in order to give some  time for
the  private  sector  to evolve  and  eventually  take  over  the  marketing  activities
from the parastatals.  The current coffee  marketing  board,  OCIBU, will be
phased  out by December  1990 and will be replaced  by the Office  du Cafe, a
regulatory  body  for  the  coffee  sector.
66.  The process  of privacization  includes  the transfer  of ownership  of
washing stations  and hulling factories  from the government  sector to the
private sector via an asset holding company called Service de Patrimonie
(SDP).  SDP's  purpose  is to keep  an accounting  record  of the physical  assets
and liabilities  of the  washing  stations  and  hulling  factories. For  the short
term, SDP will rent these washing stations  and hulling factories to the
private sector for a  fee which will be distributed  to the governmental
organizations  which presently  hold the assets.  SDP also will sell off
progressively  the assets  that it holds to the private  sector  and distribute
the  money  from the  liquidation  to  the owners of  the assets within the
governmental  sector.  For the hulling factories  a company  named SODECO  has
been created which rents the hulling factories  from SDP and manages the
hulling  operations. It is planned  that  SODECO  will  eventually  be privatized.- 43 -
67.  The proposed  changes also include  a paraiPel  marketing facility  to
the  government's  which  will be marketing  an increasingly  higher  proportion  of
coffee.  The use of auctions  for export  sales  coffee  has been suggested  for
this parallel marketing system.  The operations  of  the private marketing
facility  will be under  the supervision  of the  Office  du Cafe.
(v)  Ethiopia  (Coffee)  1/
68.  Over  the  last  15  years  the  private sector's participation in
Ethiopia's  domestic  and export  marketing  sector  has been shrinking--from  40%
in the  early  1980s  to about  10%  at present. But recently  it  has been proposed
to expand the private  sector's  involvement  because,  (a) in some parts  of the
country where farmers are dispersed,  the parastatal  organization,  Ethiopian
Coffee Marketing Corporation (ECMC), was not  efficient in purchasing  and
transporting  coffee,  (b)  private  exporters  were considerably  more effective  in
finding speciality  coffee  export  markets,  and (c) the existence  of a private
sector  enabled  the  government  to evaluate  the  efficiency  of ECMC in marketing.
69.  Under the proposal,  more coffee  w.ll be allowed to be delivered  to
auction centers by private traders  and then sold to private  exporters.  The
proposal  also  includes privatization of  a  number  of  coffee  processing
facilities,  reduction  of export  tax  rates,  and  devaluation.
1/  In March 1990,  the Ethiopian  Government  announced  its intention  to reduce
considerably  it controls over private sector participation.  Given the
importance  of the coffee  sector,  it should  be a  major beneficiary  of any
reduction  of intervention.- 44 -
(vi)  Uganda  (Coffee)
70.  In Uganda  the recent  fall of coffee  prices  motivated  the government
to streamline  and cut costs of the Coffee  Marketing  Board (CMB).  Priorities
were given to increasing  accountability  and efficiency  of the existing  system
and developing  a system  to monitor  the physical  and monetary  flows  associated
with coffee.  It was also found  that the export  sales  strategy  was done  on an
ad hoc basis without examination  of alternative  strategies. A lot of sales
were of the  form of barter  and  pre-financing  agreements. The beneficiaries  of
barter sales usually  did not reimburse  CMB until very late.  The government
has rejected  the  option  of selling  all the  exportable  coffee  through  auctions
to  private exporters.  However, it has expressed interest  in private  sector
participation  by means of auction in the export of specific qualities of
coffees.  The qualities  of coffee  mentioned  in this regard  are arabicas  and
some high-quality  robustas.  The prices  obtained  at auctions  are believed  to
reflect better the quality premia for these coffees.  The existing  domestic
pricing  system  does not  distinguish  between  different  qualities.
71.  In February of  1990 the Government of Uganda announced that it
intends  to allow  four cooperatives  to export,  in  addition  to CMB.- 45 -
(vii)  Ghana  (Cocoa,  Coffee)  1/
72.  The emphasis  on reforming  the  cocoa  pricing  system  in Ghana has beer
due not only to the importance  of cocoa in export revenues  but also to the
very high  levels of  implicit taxation embodied in  the pre-1984 producer
prices. The resulting  low  producer  prices  led  to a decline  in  production  from
over 400,000 tons in the early 1970s to 159,000 tons by  1985. Under a
structural adjustment credit of the World Bank, the government agreed to
increase  producer  prices  to a level  corresponding  approximately  to 55%  of the
world price by the 1988/89  crop year.  With a price  increase  of 5.5Z in June
1989,  cocoa producer  prices in Ghana are now 60% of the world price--up  from
30% in 1983/84.  The increase  in producer  price relative  to the world price
has been partly  met by squeezing  COCOBOD's  2/ share  of cocoa  revenues. There
is  the  intention to  reorganize COCOBOD, and  in  particular its  Service
Division, which is responsible  for input distribution  and extension work.
COCOBOD  is planning  to "gradually  privatize"  its  input  distribution  activities
and  eliminate input subsidies.  Privatization  is also intended for cocoa
marketing, by  progressively allowing private agents  to  engage  in  crop
purchasing  and  collecting  activities. Collection  and purchasing  are  currently
the  responsibility of  the  Produce Buying Corporation (PBC), a  COCOBOD
subsidiary. Within  PBC,  emphasis  will be placed  on improving  its  efficiency,
starting  with the  closing  of underutilized  upcountry  cocoa  buying  s:ations.
1/  For  Ghana  see also  Commander  (1989)  Chapter  7.
2/  Chanaian  Cocoa  Marketing  Board.- 46 -
73.  With regard to coffee, COCOBOD is planning to set coffee producer
prices closer to world market levels, by paying a minimum 652 of the FOB
price.  Also in the planning  stage  is for COCOBOD  to relinquish  its  monopoly
on coffee hulling, trading and exporting,  again by allowing private sector
entry.
(viii) Kenya  (Coffee)
74.  Payments to coffee growers in Kenya are  expected to become more
timely. As outlined  in  Annex II,  payments  to Kenyan  coffee  growers  consist  of
an initial  payment  at the  time  of delivery  to collection  points  and subsequent
payments  based  on the  price  realized  at auction  and the  yearly  average  auction
price.  Growers have complained that the time elapsed between the initial
payment  and subsequent  payments  was too long, sometimes  as long as 18 months
between the first  and last payment.  A World Bank project loan was given to
increase  the liquidity  of the pricing  system  so that the  amount  of the initial
payment  could  be increased  and subsequent  payments  be more timely.
(ix)  Tanzania  (coffee)
75.  Efforts are  underway in Tanzania to  liberalize export marketing
channels for coffee, cotton and cashew nuts.  Farmer incentives  are to be
improved  by linking  producer  prices  more closely to world prices.  Under the
new system the marketing board will relinquish  direct ownership.  Also, it
will not  participate in the purchasing  and selling of coffee, cotton and
cashew nuts.  Primary Cooperative Societies (PCS), estate  farmers, and- 47 -
farmers  associations,  which at present have to sell their produce to the
marketing  board,  will be able  to sell  their  coffee  directly  through  auction  or
tender.
76.  In the  existing  coffee  marketing  system,  farmers  sell their  coffee  to
the PCSs which channel  it through  the Regional  Cooperative  Unions (RCUs)  to
the Tanzania  Coffee  Marketing Board (TCMB).  The Board sells the coffee  at
auction  which the Board also operates.  Farmers  receive  their  first payment
when they sell their coffee  to the PCSs,  an interim  payment  one year later,
and the final payment 18 months  later.  TCMB also provides  inputs  to coffee
growers through the PCS-RCU channels.  This system often resulted in the
delivery  of the wrong inputs and the "cost-recovery"  system, through  which
mandatory  deductions  were made from the prices received  by the farmers,  was
costly  to farmers.
77.  Under the proposed  marketing  system,  TCMB will continue  to operate
the auctions.  Producers  will send their coffee  to the auction  floor,  under
their own name, and receive the full price  which their  coffee  fetches.  TCMB
will continue  providing  quality control  and research  and development  to the
coffee  subsector,  as well as representing  Tanzania  in the  International  Coffee
Organization. TCMB could also provide  shipping  services  for the cooperative
unions  in competition  with private  agents. Currently,  TCMB through  its  Export
Division,  buys  on its  own behalf  through  the  auctions  around  30%  of the  coffee
put up for auction (the rest  s sold to private  traders). The new marketing
system has not resolved the future of the Export Division.  It could be
eliminated,  or made into a separat-  entity.  As a separate  entity it could
initially  be a parastatal  but eventually  privatized. RCUs and PCSs  will have- 48 -
the  option  of  buying  coffee  from  farmers,  retaining  ownership  and  sending  it
to  the  auction  floor  under  their  own  name  and  receive  full  payment  directly.
(x) C6te  d'Ivoire  and  Cameroon  (Coffee,  Cocoa)
78.  In  both  C6te  d'Ivoire  and  Cameroon,  the  prolonged  fixing  of producer
prices  for  coffee  and  cocoa  at levels  not  consistent  with  market  prices  1/  led
to huge  debts for the caisses  and to liquidity  problems  in the marketing
chain. The situation  was  only  relieved  when  there  was  a sharp  reduction  in
producer  prices  in September  of 1989.  2/  Not only were producer  prices
changed,  the  whole  bareme  was  revised  and  fixed  profit  and  commercialization
margins  were  reduced.  The  operations  of  the  caisses  were  also  evaluated.  The
immediate  result  was  a severe  reduction  of the  caisses'  work  force. Other
changes  have  been  proposed.
79.  More specifically,  in C6te d'Ivoire's  case the recent  proposals
include:  (a)  introduction  .7f  a quality  premium  for  coffee;  (b)  reduction  of
domestic  marketing  costs  for both  coffee  and  cocoa  and  review  of the  coffee
and  cocoa  marketing  policies;  (c)  improvements  in  efficiency  of the  Caisse's
operations  by streamling  its  activities,  improving  management,  transferring
commercial  activities  to  the  private  or  cooperative  sector,  and  increasing  its
exposure  to  market  forces.
1/ During  the  second  quarter  of  1989,  when  the  FOB  price  for  cocoa  from  C6te
d'Ivoire  was around  US$1,390/ton,  the  Ivorian  cocoa  farmer  was  receiving
US$1,216/ton  and  the  total  cost  to  the  Caisse  was  around  US$2,100/ton.
2/ C6te  d'Ivoire  had  already  reduced  the  cocoa  producer  price  for  the  mid-
crop  1988/89  from  CFA400/kg  to  CFA250/kg  in  early  July  1989.- 49 -
80.  The government  intends  to maintain  a fixed  producer  price.  However,
it is Droposed  that this fixed price be gradually  transformed  into a floor
price  and  allow  producers  to benefit  from the  competition  at prices  abovE this
level.
81.  The  Cameroon  Government  is  considering  abolition  of the  fixed  pricing
system,  which  will result  in the  elimination  of the  price stabilization  fund,
and also allow greater  private  sector  participation  in the marketing  system.
The government  has abolished the licensing of  buying agents for  specific
areas.  A licensed  buying  agent can now purchase  crops from anywhere in the
country,  as in the Ivorian  system.  Proposals  for the government  to auction
licenses  or allow  free  entry  have  not yet  met  with its  approval.
(xi)  Mali (Cotton)
82.  Following  the severe  collapse  of world cotton  prices  in 1986 and  the
financial  losses  sustained  by the Cotton  Corporation,  the government  of Mali
made substantial  changes in its cotton marketing and pricing system.  The
reform  measures  are aimed at improving  incentives  for greater  efficiency  and
international  competitiveness. Institutional  reforms  are directed  toward  the
Compagnie  Malienne pour le Developpement  des Textiles  (CMDT)  which functions
both as a cotton  marketing  agency  and a comprehensive  development  agency.  In
the  past CMDT  performed its  cotton extension, marketing, processing and
ezporting  functions  on behalf of the government  within  an annually approved
budget. The reform  program  will limit  government  intervention  by transferring
all aspects of cotton lint production  and marketing  to CMDT.  All of CMDT's- so  -
commercial  activities,  including  cotton  ginning,  marketing  and exporting,  will
be taken  at its own risk and with the  possibility  of making  profits. It will
receive  revenues  from  cotton  exports. Profits  made from  these  exports  will be
shared  with the government through  a profits tax and with cotton producers
through a price premium.  The cotton budget  and cotton export tax will be
eliminateJ.  Details  of the distribution  mechanism  are specified  in the  CMDT
performance  contract.
83.  As a  development  institution,  CMDT is responsible  for most of the
rural  development  services  offered in the Mali Sud region.  It will continue
to  perform  rural  development  work on behalf  of the  government  as an integrated
part of the  national  investment  program. These  activities  will be financed  by
the  government.
84.  The  major  pricing reform constitutes the  transformation  of  the
present  guaranteed  producer  price for seed cotton  into  a "floor"  price,  which
will be adjusted  upward  or downward  in response  to changing  world  prices  for
cotton.
(xii)  Chad (Cotton)
85.  Prompted  by the sharp fall in world cotton  prices  in 1985 and 1986,
the  cotton marketing board  in  Chad undertook drastic reorganization  and
operational  measures  to  ensure  the  viability  of  cotton  growing  and
exporting.  The measures affected, in the main, were the producer pricing
system  and the regional  distribution  of production. Details  of the background- 51 -
and changes  are presented  in Annex I on production  and marketing  of cotton  in
Francophone  West  Africa.
(xiii) Tanzania  (Cotton)
86.  The  cotton  marketing  board  in Tanzania  will transfer  the  ownership  of
its  ginneries  to private  companies  in the  four cotton-produ,.ing  regions. The
first  private  ginnery  is  expected  to  be operational  by the  end  of 1990  and the
others  will follow  later.  Initially,  ginning  services  will be provided  to the
farmer cooperatives  for a  fee.  At a  later stage, the possibility  of the
ginning companies  purchasing  seedcotton  from the cooperatives  for their own
account  will be explored.- 52 -
IV.  CONCLUDINC  REKARKS
87.  Developments in  the  world  commodity markets  in  the  1980s have
confirmed  how  competitive  and dynamic  these  markets  can  be.  Important  changes
have been taking place in the technologies  used in producing  and marketing
commodities  and in the policies  of countries  producing  them.  World  demand  has
also been changing rapidly in terms of  tastes, quality preferences, and
location  of markets.  As a rerult of these changes, 1/  prices  of several
agricultural  commodities  important  to Sub-Saharan  Africa, in terms  of export
revenues &ad  employment, have  experienced sharp  falls.  The  subsequent
declines in export revenues  have led to burgeoning  government  deficits for
m=,ny  Sub-Saharan  African  goverments  and  put  enormous  stress  on their  marketing
and pricing systems.  Because of the relatively  buoyant world agricultural
commodity  markets in the 1960s  and 1970s,  and because  of the  vested  interests
which had built up over the years in maintaining  these systems  intact,  there
has been little  interest  in careful  evaluation  of these  systems  or in looking
to the possibility  of alternatives.  This situation has changed with the
recent  fall in  world  prices  and the  loss  of export  markets.
88.  An  important feature of  the  marketing and  pricing systems for
agriculturaL  export  commodities  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  is that they have been,
until  recently,  completely  or  predominantly under  government  control;
1/  In addition  to factors  above, the suspension  of the International  Coffee
Agreement  in  July 1989  caused  world  coffee  prices  to decline  sharply.- 53 -
therefore,  the  employees  of marketing  agencies  essentially  have the status  of
government employees.  Because many  activities undertaken by  marketing
agencies  are of a  commercial  nature--exploring  new markets, competing  with
products  exported by other countries,  etc.--the incentive system for their
employees  is not congruent  with effectiveness  in such commercial  operations.
In  light of  this,  the  first question to  be  asked  in evaluating these
organizations  should  be:  Do they  need  to be,  or is it  desirable  that  they be,
government  controlled?  Probably  the second  question  should  be:  Can all or,
at least,  some parts of the activities  of these  organizations  be privatized?
As Shirley (1989)  points out in respect  of the privatization  of parastatals
"...the  most important  first  step (should]  be to clarify  the  basic  objectives
and operating  principles  of all state-owned  enterprises".  1/
89.  The  survey of  recent developments given in  the paper show that
several  Sub-Saharan African  governments, after  evaluating their  export
marketing agencies, have taken or are  taking steps to lessen government
controls  and to privatize  at least  parts of their operations.  These steps
include  abolition  of the marketing  boards in Nigeria,  complete  or increased
pArticipation  of the private sector in marketing of products in Madagascar
(coffee), Zaire  (coffee), and  Ethiopia  (coffee), and  privatization of
processing facilities in  Zaire  (coffee), Burundi  (coffee) and  Tanzania
(cotton).
1/  See  Shirley  (1989)  page 1.- 54 -
90.  Rigidly-fixed  producer  pricing  systems  have also come under scrutiny
in several  Sub-Saharan  countries.  For some countries,  this was inevitable.
Governments were  no  longer able to  maintain fixed producer prices with
government  deficits  increasing  sharply,  or because  export tax rates  were too
high ani discouraged production.  Consequently,  countries such as Nigeria
(cocoa), Madagascar  (coffee), Zaire  (coffee), and  Mali  (cotton) have
introduced  producer pricing systems which are more flexible  and which now
reflect  world  prices  to a  greater  degree.
91.  In  order  to maintain the  transparency of  transacted  prices, to
enforce repatriation  of foreign exchange and to  impose relevant taxes on
exported  products  after freeing  producer  and export prices, some new policy
instruments  have be-n, or are expected  to be, introduced. These instruments
include  the "reference  price" system  in Madagascar  (coffee)  and auctions  in
Burundi (coffee)  and Ethiopia (coffee).  1/  As for possible  adverse  effects
from  wide fluctuations  in  producers'  prices,  various  financial  instruments  for
risk management and  progressive  export tax  systems can  be  used to  keep
producer  prices relatively  stable, instead of having rigidly-fixed  producer
price systems.  From a market  efficiency  point of view, producer  prices  with
some  variability  reflecting  world prices  is a much more desirable  system  than
fixed prices as they then perform the important  role of transmitting  world
market  signals  to producers.
1/  Although coffee auctions have been in  xistence in Ethiopia,  they have
been  heavily  controlled  by the  government  until  recently.- 55 -
92.  This is  not to imply  that  governments  do not  have any role  to play in
agricultural  export commodity sectors.  They do have the important  role of
determining  policies such as exchange rates and tax rates which impact on
these  sectors  in critical  ways.  However,  too often  these  policies  are formed
without adequate analysis  of their impact  on the sectors,  although several
practical  and  rather  easy  methods  exist  for  doing  so.
93.  Recent developments  in marketing and pricing systems suggest that
transforming  these systems from heavily government-controlled  ones to ones
with considerably  less or no control is definitely  possible  and generates
positive results.  The experiences  of the several countries  described  here
suggest that the paths to be taken toward  more private  sector  participation
depend  very much on the form of the  marketing  and pricing  systems  already  in
existence,  and on the time needed  for the  necessary  skills  to develop  in the
private  sector. However,  some  generalizations  can be made including:
(a)  Complete  and/or increased  privatization  of the marketing  system  and
adoption  of free-market  pricing is easier under the Caisse system
than  with the  Marketing  Board  system. Under  the  Caisse  system,  there
is already  private  sector  handling  of domestic  and export  marketing.
Thus, the transition  will essentially  imply  increased  competition  in
the  existing  private  sector.
(b)  Under  the  monopolistic Marketing Board system, countries should
identify activities, such as  processing, that  can  be  performed
immed,ately  by the private  sector  and steps  can be taken  to transfer
these  activities  to the private  sector.- 56 -
(c)  In countries with the Marketing Board system and a  weak private
sector,  export  and  domestic  marketing  can  initially  be shared  by  the
boards  and  the  private  sector,  with  boards  acting  as  "buyers  of  last
resort".  Over time the boards  should  be treated  as just  another  one
of the  marketing  agencies  competing  with the  private  sector.  1/
(d)  After taking  steps  (b)  and (c)  Marketing  Boards  will be like  Caisses
and in time  will take step  (a)  above.
(e)  If an imediate  change from a  fixed producer pricing system to a
free-market pricing  system  is  not  feasible  or  judged  to  be
undesirable, gradual  steps  in  the  transition can  be  made  by
implementing  a  progressive  export  tax  system with  greater
progressiveness  at  the  initial  stage.
1/ One  form  of "sharing"  may be accomplished  through  adjusting  shares  of
products  to  be sold  at auctions. Initially,  the  marketing  board  will  be
guaranteed  to handle  a specific  amount  of the crop,  say 70Z,  with the
remainder  going  through  an  auction  system;  thus  producing  some  competition
into the system.  As the interest  in auctions  increases  and private
enterpreneurehip  is fortified  and  becomes  more  experienced,  the  share  of
the  corp  that  goes  through  the  auction  can  be  increased.  In  this  process
the  marketing  board  will  eventually  become  just  another  agent  competing  in
the  auction  marketing  and  can  eventually  be  privatized  or  abolished.  The
gradual  process  will  help  the  marketing  board  adjust  its  size,  become  more
efficient  and  assure  a  smooth  transition.- 57 -
ANNEX  I:  THE INTEGRATED  COTTON  PRODUCTION  AND  MARKETING
STRUCTURE  IN FRANCOPHONE  WEST  AFRICA
94.  The  rapid  reconstruction  of the  European  textile  industries  following
World War II sharply increased  the world demand for cotton.  The supply  of
mainly  US cotton  was insufficient  to meet this demand.  In response,  several
European countries, including Belgium, France, Portugal and  the  United
Kingdom, heavily promoted  cotton growing in Africa.  Of those efforts, the
cotton production and marketing structure introduced in  Francophone  West
Africa has been the most durable and in its adapted form still prevails in
several  countries.  1/
95.  In spite  of the long  period  needed  to establish  cotton  production  in
the  Francophone  countries  south  of the  Sahara,  its  technical  success  in recent
years has been impressive.  This success is indicated  by a comparison  of
cotton lint yields in those countries  with yields in other major cotton-
growing  countries  and the  world since  1970  (Table  Al).
96.  The cotton production  and marketing structures  of the Francophone
countries  in West Africa  were developed  with a similar  pattern  of integrated
input  supply,  extension  services,  research  support  and  marketing
arrangements. Initially,  cotton  producers  were assured  of receiving
1/  Cotton  producing  Francophone  Africa  countries  include  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, C6te d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger,
Senegal  and Togo.- 58 -
Table  Al:  OJlUN YlFJX IN iV*CJIHUI AFRICA  AND)  QCPAR19SE  WIM  arlER  FRIS
Burkina
Crop  Year  Benin  Faso  Cueroon  Chad  0Bte  d'lvoire  Mali  ?dgeria  Togo
(Yield:  kg/ha)
1970/71  349  105  139  113  326  302  108  299
1971/72  289  141  160  130  386  325  94  279
1972/73  399  171  191  141  377  315  136  234
1973/74  325  147  171  159  374  272  96  269
1974/75  244  184  218  195  400  334  156  318
1975/76  246  226  210  211  399  423  167  277
1976/77  145  255  283  169  474  424  229  314
1977/78  109  202  290  160  470  425  114  249
1978/79  144  311  403  185  437  422  129  319
1979/80  131  350  542  176  471  393  124  293
1980/81  87  304  499  188  442  418  121  315
1981/82  152  332  487  195  451  482  96  360
1982/83  174  399  495  275  553  580  96  117
1983/84  174  390  451  340  429  521  71  341
1984/85  31.3  430  492  247  605  453  72  501
1985/86  324  484  516  262  538  450  46  483
1986/87  479  574  517  252  585  524  99  602
1987/88  335  530  426  300  691  473  85  472
ypc  TInia  Pakistmn  Suna  Tanzania  Turkey  74mbe  World
1970/7l  744  132  311  483  269  759  321  378
1971/72  795  165  362  484  231  760  482  389
1972/73  788  153  336  412  271  714  590  403
1973/74  729  158  243  481  238  756  499  419
1974/75  717  174  300  453  261  716  568  416
1975/76  676  159  267  276  112  717  636  393
1976/77  756  154  224  393  165  819  523  403
1977/78  667  172  3W  433  126  739  569  421
1978n9  878  173  244  333  132  728  564  396
1979/80  963  175  368  277  135  778  533  414
1980/81  1011  176  341  253  195  743  504  441
1981/82  1008  186  343  433  113  746  404  470
1982/83  1031  194  364  484  119  822  435  471
1983/84  991  171  214  510  125  850  492  461
1984/85  965  232  451  492  150  781  469  565
1985/86  959  240  522  430  126  785  374  544
1986/87  895  222  527  431  123  885  329  508
1987/88  856  203  585  492  123  897  350  533
Sirce:  United States  DIpartt  of  Agriculture- 59 -
production  inputs,  credit,  technical  advice  and local  marketing  services  from
the Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement  des Fibres Textiles (CFDT).
Local  research,  including  the  development  of technical  packages  of recommended
practices  and varieties  adapted  to prevailing  conditions,  was provided  by the
Institute de Recherches du Coton et des Textiles Exotiques (IRCT).  This
system proved  very effective in promoting  cotton production  as a cash crop
among subsistence  farmers,  and raw cotton  exports  became  an important  source
of  foreign exchange earnings within  the  region.  With  the  increasing
importance  of cotton  to the economic  welfare  of several  countries,  the  cotton
marketing  structures  have undergone  considerable  adjustment  in recent  years.
As  African  nationals acquired skills  in  operating the  systems, local
parastatal  organizations  acquired  partial  interest  in the cotton  research  and
marketing organizations.  Concurrently,  the number of expatriate  advisors
involved  in the  operation  of the  production  and  marketing  complex  was  reduced.
97.  Several  weaknesses  in this system  were exposed  during  the severe  and
sustained decline in cotton prices in 1985 and 1986.  They included the
downward inflexibility  of cotton producer  prices, inadequate  accounting  and
financial controls, the  tendency of  governments to  assign  the  cotton
organizations  special  development  projects  that they  were poorly  qualified  to
carry out, loss of operating  efficiency  due to over-staffing,  and inadequate
attention  to the international  competitiveness  of national  production  systems.
98.  The financial  deficits  encountered  by the cotton  sub-sectors  during
the  mid-1980s have  been  addressed by  adjustments of  varying intensity.
Perhaps the  most drastic measures to  restore the  financial and  economic- 60 -
viability  of the cotton sub-sector  were taken in Chad.  Producer  prices  of
seedcotton  in Chad  were initially  frozen  at CFAF 100/kg  and later  decreased  to
CFAF 90/kg with future payments  being linked  to the world market price for
lint.  Input  subsidies  were  removed  over a two-year  period. Cotton  production
was continued  only in the  most efficient  growing  areas.  The concentration  of
production facilitated the  closing of  six  of  the  12  ginneries formerly
operated;  non-essential  or  non-performing  assets  were  sold  (two  aircrafts,  80
trucks,  69 cars);  the  number  of cotton-buying  centers  was reduced;  and the
cotton  company's  staff  was  reduced  by  one-half.  Cotton  production  in  Chad  has
recovered  strongly  under  the  adjustment  program  and  the  subsector  now  appears
to  be  operating  on  a sounder  financial  basis.- 61 -
ANNEX  II:  THE  KENYA  COFFEE  AND  TEA MARKETINC  AND  PRICING  SYSTEMS
99.  In Kenya the Marketing  and pricing  system  is, philosophically,  that
of a free  market.  Despite  the existence  of marketing  boards  for both coffee
and tea 1/, government's  involvement  is kept to a minimum.  In the case of
tea,  TBK sets the general  policies,  conducts  R & D, and  chooses  new areas  for
production  expansion.  The organization  that implements  the  policies  for the
smallholders'  tea sector is the Kenya Tea Development  Authority (KTDA).  2/
KTDA's  policy  has been to avoid insulating  either itself  or the  growers  from
market  influences.  3/  The purpose  of KTDA from its inception  was to:  (a)  be
an essentially  commercial  enterpise;  (b) finance its capital investment  by
borrowing from sources  other than the government;  and (c) acquire specific
responsibilities  from  the  Ministry of  Agriculture related to  commercial
operations.  Government  policy  has been to maintain  the autonomy  of KTDA as
the managing body of the smallholder  tea program.  The payment to farmers
consists  of a flat payment based on the weight of product delivered  and a
second,  annually-variable  payment  based  on the net earnings  achieved  when tea
is sold in the world market.  For both coffee  and tea, a two-tier  payment
system is employed  to pay higher prices for higher quality products.  The
first  payments,  which  are lower  than  the  expected  average  f.o.b.  price  for  the
1/  Tea Board  of Kenya  (TBK)  for  tea  and  Coffee  Board  of Kenya  (CBK).
2/  The  estate  tea  growing  sector operates  totally  under  free  market
conditions.
3/  For  more information  on KTDA see  Lamb  G., and  L. Muller,  (1982).- 62  -
crop year,  are paid at the time of the farmer's  delivery  to collection
points. Tea or coffee  delivered  is  forwarded  to auction  centers  with  clear
markings  identifying  which  processing  stations  produced  them.  When a crop
year is over,  CBK and KTDA calculate  how much should  be paid as second
payments. Since  CBK and KTDA  keep  records  of the  qualities  of and prices
fetched  by  individual  processing  stations,  they  can  make  second  payments  which
reflect  prices  paid  for  specific  qualities  at the  auctions.  1/  There  is a
small  export  tax  on  tea.
100.  In the  case  of coffee  the  Kenyan  Planters  Cooperative  Union  (KPCU)
processes  and  moves  coffee  on  behalf  of  the  farmers  coops,  unions  and  estates.
Ownership  of coffee  remains  with the farmer  until  the auctions,  with KPCU
receiving  a fee for its services. After  the coffee  is hulled,  bagged  and
graded  by KPCU, CBK performs  liquoring  tests.  The bags of coffee  are
subsequently  stored  until  they  are  auctioned  on  behalf  of  the  farmers  by  Kenya
Coffee  Auction  Ltd.,  a firm  of  brokers  which  is  a subsidiary  of  CBK. At the
auction,  CBK's  liquoring  test  results  are  available  to the  auctioneer  only.
Buyers  can  perform  their  own  liquoring  test  to  determine  their  bids. In  this
way the  quality  control  system  is  double  checked. If  there  is  a  discrepancy
between  the  bids  and  the  auctioneers'  price,  new  liquoring  tests  are  performed
by  CBK  to  reassess  the  coffee  quality.  Participating  buyers  at  these  auctions
are  private  licensed  dealers  who  are  solely  responsible  for  export  sales.  The
price  received  by  the  farmer  is  linked  to  the  world  market  price. The  farmer
1/  Second  payments  are paid at the processing  factory  level,  however,  so
there  are  no payment  differentials  among  farmers  at the same  processing
station.- 63 -
receives  a first  payment  which  is followed  by subsequent  payments  depending  on
the quality of his coffee and  the average price realized at the auctions
during  the  year.  The farmers'  coooperatives,  unions,  KPCU  and CBK all  perform
services  on behalf  of the farmer  for  a fee  and  at no stage  along the  marketing
chain do they own the crop.  The taxation  of the coffee  sector  is small in
comparison  with that in  most other  coffee-exporting  countries,  and comparable
to that  of tea.- 64 -
ANNEX  III:  MEANS  OF TRANSITION  FROM  FIXED  TO FLEXIBLE
PRODUCER  PRICING  SYSTEMS
101.  As  discussed  in Section III, the fixed producer  pricing system  in a
number  of Sub-Saharan  African  countries  suffered  serious  financial  problems  in
recent  years.  In the last few years, several.  Sub-Saharan  African  countries,
including  Nigeria,  Madagascar  and Zaire, have changed from a fixed producer
pricing system  to a more market-determined  system.  However,  many other Sub-
Saharan  African  countries  are reluctant  to implement  such  changes.
102.  The reasons  for  their  reluctance  usuaily  include;
(a)  fluctuating  producer  prices  are  detrimental  to  the  healthy
development  of the  sector  concerned,
(b)  farmers  are likely to be paid less than "fair" prices, especially
those  in poorly  accessible  regions,
(c)  private  exporters  would not repatriate  the "right"  amount  of foreign
exchange  to the  Central  Bank and,
(d)  the  government  would  lose  control  of important  sectors.- 65  -
103.  Newberry  and  Stiglitz  1/ argue  that  there  are  many cases  where stable
producer prices might not  be  beneficial for  the sector and  the  farmers
involved.  This would  be  the  case  if  supply and  price are  negatively
correlated.  Then stabilizing  prices  destabilize  income.  Even if they are
beneficial,  because  of financial  pressures  it is doubtful  if governments  can
maintain  stable  producer  prices  in face  of widely  fluctuating  world  commmodity
prices.
104.  One way to share  the risk of variable  world  prices  between  producers
and  government  is to implement  a progressive  ad-valorem  export  tax  system. By
varying the progressiveness  of the tax schedule,  situations  ranging from a
fixed  producer  pricing  system  on the one hand (max' Du progressiveness,  where
1002  of the  price  above  a certain  level is taxed  anu complete  compensation  is
given to producers below a  certain price level) to a  free market pricing
bystem (zero progressiveness  can be simulated).  Markusen (1984)  has found
that  export  taxes  yield  a higher  social  welfare  than  Marketing  Board  policies.
105.  Ethiopia employs a  progressive tax  system for  coffee which  has
achieved relatively  stable  producer prices.  A caveat is that under such a
system, below certain low levels  of world prices, it becomes a free market
system  if subsidies,  i.e.,  negative  taxes,  are  to be avoided.
106.  For taxation  and foreign  exchange  repatriation  purposes, it may be
necessary  to  establish  "reference" export  prices  if  exports  are  not
1/  See  Newberry  and Stiglitz  (1981).- 66 -
exclusively  handled by a parastatal  organization.  This can be arhieved by
monitoring  price quotations in major consuming  markets.  For instance, the
Colombian  Coffee Federation  uses the "Other Milds" coffee  price in the New
York future market as  its reference price, and  in Madagascar the Comite
National  de Cafe monitors  coffee  prices in Europe.  These agencies  estimate
f.o.b. prices after deducting  appropriate  transporacion  and insurance  costs
from c.i.f. prices.  The estimated f.o.b. prices may not be actual prices
received by  private exporters.  However, this  system encourages private
exporters  to obtain  the  highest  prices  possible  to increase  their  profits.
107.  From the estimated f.o.b. prices, taxes,  domestic transport  costs,
processing  and export pereparation  fees can be deduced to arrive  at minimum
producer  p  :es. This is  how the  guaranteed  price  (for  coffee  above  a certain
quality) paid to coffee producers by  the Colombian Coffee Federation is
calculated.
108.  Theoretically,  if there is competition  among private buyers in the
domestic market, the probability  of farmers receiving prices considerably
lower than  the  market  price would  be  low.  However, the  existence of
parastatals,  especially  at the beginning  of privatization  and the free  market
pricing stage, might be helpful in enforcing minimum producer prices.  In
Madagascar,  Colombia 1/ and Mexico, parastatal  purchasing  organizations  co-
exist  and  compete  with  private  buyers  in  the  domestic  markets.
1/ The National  Coffee Federation  of Colombia  is not a  parastatal  but
performs  as  one.- 67 -
109.  Another  way to determine  f.o.b.  and producer  prices  is to organize  a6ttion
markets.  Auction markets for coffee exist in Kenya,  Ethiopia,  Tanzania  and
Zimbabwe (coffee and tobacco)  and for tea in Kenya and Malawi.  A coffee
auction  market  is being  considered  in  Burundi. Determining  prices  at well-run
auction  markets has the advantage  that prices reflect  market  conditions  and
are transparently  determined.
110.  An  auction system is not  appropriate for marketing all  commodities,
however.  For example, in the  case of  cotton, a  durable commodity with
generally  agreed  quality  characteristics, widely  available  arbitration
facilities,  and  modern communication f&cilities, the  advantage of  broad
participation in  the  price  forming  process  is  better  assured  by  an
international  tender  than by a local auction.  An examination  in 1989 of the
possibility  of changing  the  marketing  of Tanzanian  cotton  to an auction  system
concluded  that the likely  reduction  in  market  participation  made such  a change
impractical.  Tanzania continues to  market its cotton internationally  by a
tender  system.  1/
111.  The  question of  farmers in poorly accessible regions receiving lower
prices  was considered  when INMECAFE,  a coffee  mark-ting  parastatal  in Mexico
was planning to withdraw from domestic  marketing activities.  INMECAFE  has
recently  been organizing small farmers in these regions into co-operatives
aimed  at strengthening  their  bargaining  position  with private  traders.
1/  Mote  that auctions  for  cotton  did  exist  in Tanzania  and  Sudan  in the 1960s
but  subsequently  were abolished.- 68 -
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